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International Implications of the Japanese Conquest of China

• Dr. Fritz Klein

From "Die Dritte Front," Prague, Czechoslovakia

"Attention, sleepwalker. Do not spoil things!" With this warning, apparently addressed to Hitler, Dr. Klein attempts to conjure up the immediate future on the international political scene. His prognosis is most interesting—if not quite certain.

THE ECONOMIC resources of China will make of Japan a power of the first rank. This empire will not be thoroughly Japanese at first . . . And in a hundred years or so it may be predominantly Chinese in language and customs. But there is little doubt now that unless help is given to China within the next three months, which is rather improbable, it will undergo an economic and political fusion with Japan, Manchouria and Korea to form a great Mongolian empire.

The rise of this Far Eastern world power connotes the end of Anglo-Saxon dominion in the Pacific. It is questionable if the United States will then be able, or want to, hold on to the Philippines. And whether or not England is able to defend Hongkong will depend on the strength and vitality of a national South China. The entire might of Great Britain will then have to be risked to preserve British rule in the area of the Indian Ocean. That will not be easy once the position of the British Empire in the Far East is shaken by sweeping Japanese conquest in China. For whether or not Mussolini has his way in Spain, Italy will continue to threaten the classic road to India. If Mussolini wins out in Spain, England must say goodbye to the Gibraltar-Malta-Port Said thoroughfare. And should Fascist Italy fail to get what it is after in Spain, the Sicily-Pantalleria-Tripoli barrier will still threaten England's Mediterranean route. So that to save their power in the Indian Ocean, the British must guard at all costs the route around Africa. It is on this consideration that all of Hitler's fond dreams of a colonial empire in Africa must founder. For what Germany wants and what Hitler could use is not merely a little rind of the African pie but the large middle African dominion that the pre-war German politicians liked to imagine: Kamerun, the French and Belgian Congo, Angola, Tangayika, Mozambique—an equatorial empire stretching from Fernando Po to Zanzibar. England might have lent an ear to such a proposal if Hitler had helped the British to stop the march of the Italians into Ethiopia and to the sources of the Nile, or if he had helped to prevent Japan's seizure of Shanghai. In that case, the British might have permitted themselves to be generous at the expense of Portugal, Belgium and France. But now their defeat in Abyssinia and in the Pacific obliges the British to defend their positions in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans by all means at hand.

The United States too has met with a reversal in China. It too will seek to cling more tenaciously to its remaining positions now that it has lost one of them. The United States will attempt to preserve its position in the Southern and Eastern Pacific by holding up England's hand in Australia, the Malacca and Sunda Straits, and in the sphere of the Indian Ocean. It will attempt to guard its position in Latin America by en-

couraging the exclusive dominion of the "three democratic nations" in the Atlantic Ocean. With the aid of the political triangle Washington-London-Paris (which forms the military square of Newfoundland-Cape Horn-Capetown-Orkney Islands) Great Britain, the United States and France are slowly being united.

An Atlantic power in the West, a Mongolian Pacific Empire in the Far East—the general outlines of two such gigantic political forms can already be distinguished. What powers can survive between them?

If Mussolini maneuvers skillfully and manages to keep Hitler harnessed a little longer to his triumphal chariot, he may be successful in maintaining his power in the Mediterranean. But, at any rate, compared with the mentioned great powers, stretching over the two oceans, his will be a miniature empire that will not exceed Italy's forces.

What will happen to Russia?

The Soviet military situation in the Far East has not improved with recent events. It is probable that Marshal Bluecher could still drive the Japanese out of Manchouria today. But Stalin is more afraid of his generals' victories than of the reverses of the USSR in the world political arena. Soon Russia may dare a war against Japan but it will do so under much more difficult conditions than at present. Which means that Stalin has to choose between an understanding with the new Sino-Japanese Empire or an understanding with the "dynamicists" of Central Europe.

He already seems to be aiming at the latter alternative. A change of policy is already noticeable in the Comintern, which is again beginning to steer to the "left." Again abusive language is being directed against the Social Democracy. (A scapegoat must be found for defeat in Spain and the possible disbanding of the Popular Front.) While the Social Democracy, abandoned by all gods, lets the Russians possess themselves of its last stronghold, the Labor Union International, and thus delivers itself to them with its hands bound—a terrific blast against the "social-fascists" and "class betrayers" is being prepared in Moscow.

Every tactical turn of the Comintern has announced a new Russian foreign policy. The new turn against the Social Democracy and against Democracy in general can only be the prelude to a movement away from the Western Powers and toward Hitler. There are reports that Karl Radek will succeed Litvinov. During his gentle imprisonment, Karl is getting ready for big things. Radek as the new Foreign Minister of the USSR means the alliance of Moscow and Berlin. No matter what will happen with Radek, the possibility of such an alliance looms on the order of the day. For to have his hands free in the East, Stalin must cover up in the West.

An alliance with Hitler! But does Hitler want this alliance?

That is the question. The sleepwalker will get another rare chance within the next few months, or say, some time this year. An alliance with Russia. But it is doubtful if Hitler will take advantage of this opportunity. In the light of what he achieved in 1935, it is highly doubtful if he will grasp this great opportunity. His anti-Russian policy is weighed down with resentment, with spitefulness and an upstart's mock heroics. Hitler will refuse. And the Reichswehr will not see the danger close enough to force his hand.

If Stalin fails to find an alliance in the West, he will have to manage in the East. In Russian foreign policy that will

mean an aggressive attitude toward Western Europe. Stalin's Russia will become in fact the prolonged arm of the great Asiatic empire. Then Germany will find itself again caught within a pair of pincers. The Western Powers will not miss such an opportunity to rid themselves of the very annoying element that is German Nazism. Of course, England has no reason to want to see the Russian boundary move up to the Elbe. England is interested in having the impending clash produce a Europe that will enjoy peace for at least fifty years and will hold Russia securely to the Odessa-Memel line, without having the British Empire threatened, at the same time, by any "dynamic politicians" (Hitler).

Everything will turn out right for Germany if it has the strength to come to an early understanding with Great Britain on such a basis. Germany will reach the point of decision in the second or third month of the war. And only if the German people—while they are still undefeated, and still have their arms and freedom of choice—succeed in finding the road that leads to peace and to a new European order (by the way of an understanding with England, France and the Danubian States) will Germany save itself from a second and greater Versailles . . .

RED CATHOLICS • Ignazio Silone

From "Europäische Hefte," Bern

Almost annually since 1934, the C.I. has tried the manoeuvre of the "outstretched hand" on the rival organization centered in the Vatican. Silone's sermon may be said to apply closely to the last as well as to the first peace gesture made by the wily diplomats in Moscow, though it is not really meant as counsel to the latter. It is understood that they have something else in mind. It is advice addressed to the earnest "anti-fascist" who may be taken in by this manoeuvre.

ASURE SIGN of impotence is to expect our salvation from others, to expect outside forces to clear the road for us. The great majority of Italian anti-fascists suffered from this delusion. In 1922, they thought that the General Staff would liquidate Fascism. In 1923, they expected this miracle from the *Popolari*, the Catholic People's Party. In 1924, they put their hopes in the king. In 1925, they promised themselves a great deal from Mussolini's sickness. The old faker was then suffering from a swelling in the rectum. And many Italians relied on this ailment for their redemption. This hope lasted four months. Then the tumor was removed. Thus undeceived, good anti-fascists then transferred their trust to the Freemasons. In 1927, it was the deflation of the currency. Since then, war is said to hold out salvation.

This is not a peculiarly Italian phenomenon. It is a tendency that generally accompanies a condition of helplessness. I have noticed the same development in the German opposition. In the Spring of 1933, they put great hopes in the German Nationalists and the Reichswehr. In the Summer of the same year it was the international boycott movement and during the Fall the League of Nations. At the present time, hopes are being built on the Catholic Church. All of this is being played up and presented in the same way as they were in Italy. The sole difference is that things are moving more rapidly in Germany.

Of course, the powerless Germans will become as disillusioned as their Italian comrades. It is really necessary to poke fun

at them, though the sensitive may take offense. Indeed, the Fascist dictatorship is dreadful, and horrible is the deprivation of the most elementary human rights. But there is a thing that is even more dreadful. That is the freedom of slaves who have been liberated by their own master. Such freedom produces fascist States.

Of course, the contradictions in the enemy camp must be closely watched. When conflicts arise between the Fascists and the Pope, between the king and the General Staff, we must study these tendencies carefully. But what we must not believe is that others might free us. To correctly evaluate the inner contradictions in the enemy's camp, it is important for us to remain utterly objective. It is imperative for us to see through the nature of these contradictions and to recognize their real meaning, without letting ourselves be deceived by our own lack of strength. I do not in the least doubt that the German anti-fascists will be disappointed as the conflict between the Catholic Church and National Socialism progresses.

These hopes are derived, in the main, from the ideological difference separating the Catholics from the National Socialists. These hopes are nurtured by a great number of books, pamphlets and essays which weekly add fresh fuel to the polemic raging between the two ideologies. If ideas determine our social being, then the enmity between Catholicism and National Socialism must remain irreconcilable. But if ideas determine our life, then the cleft between the two supposed opposites would have remained unbridgeable also in the case of Italian Fascism and the Italian Catholic Church. Everybody knows today that the seeming abyss between the two institutions in Italy was by no means unbridgeable and that the Catholic Church became one of the strongest supports on which the Fascist Dictatorship rests today. This would have been impossible if ideas really determined our existence. No other historic experience proves better the point that ideology plays but a secondary role in real life than the course of the relations between Italian Fascism and the Catholic Church. When I remarked to a friend of mine at that time: "Have no illusions about the Catholics," he showed me shelves of books and pamphlets written by the National Socialists against Catholicism and by the Catholics against National Socialism. I answered that all of this literature had a very limited purpose. He who wants to write a history of the last few centuries of political Catholicism, can find in the libraries tons of Catholic books against Liberalism and Parliamentarism. But all this literary output did not deter the Catholics from constituting themselves later as a political party and participating in parliamentary governments. This would have been impossible if ideas really determined our being.

We must therefore start with the premise that while the real conflict between National Socialism and Catholicism assumes, I admit, very sharp ideological forms, it is not merely an ideological conflict. Purely ideological conflicts have never existed. We stand here before a rather complicated historical conflict, rooted in very definite material interests. This historic conflict, arising from a clash of material interests, manifests itself politically in two different ways of understanding the organization of German society. To chart the probable development of the conflict between the Catholic Church and the Nazis, we must discard the whole of the daily mounting polemic literature on the subject, we must forget what we have been reading, and seek an answer to these questions: "Of what social basis does the Hitler government dispose at present?" — On what social layers does the Catholic Church support itself at present?" —

"In what direction is the relationship between these different social groups oriented?"

He who makes this analysis will convince himself that there is little reason for having any illusions on the score of the Catholics.

Translated by W. Sauter

BRITAIN: "PARTIES OF THE LEFT"

• F. A. Ridley

See "Parties of the Right" in preceding issue.

IF THE "right" parties on the English political scene present a somewhat colorless and confusing spectacle, far worse is the case in respect of the parties on, or verging on, the Left. The line of the poet: "O what a shifting party (original 'part'!) colored scene," might have been written with an eye on the English scene in 1937, as it presents itself to the casual spectator. In their multifarious efforts to untangle the Gordian knot presented by capitalist society, the British "advanced" movements have managed to achieve a positively Ju-jitsu dexterity in tying themselves up into the most fantastic patterns. Rushing in "where angels fear to tread," let us enter the "left" Labyrinth, and enumerate the tortuous byways that it conceals.

The Liberal Party. At the moment split into several sections, represented by Lloyd George, Sir Archibald Sinclair, besides, of course, the "National" group already alluded to. Politically, a misfit, capitalist in form and "socialist" (i.e. social-democratic) in substance. If and when the party splits, the leaders—and the moneybags—will go into the Conservative Party; the rank and file into the Labour Party, e.g., between the Tory and Liberal leadership there is no difference, except in the greater "wooliness" of the latter. Between the rank and file of the Liberal and Labour Parties there is now no difference at all, particularly as the verbal difference which once separated "Socialism" (Labour) from "Democracy," (Liberal) has now been abandoned in favour of the latter term.

The leading ideas of the Liberal Party? Free Trade and the League of Nations, i.e., a myth and a mummy. Prototype? Mohammed's coffin, which hung suspended in mid-air, unwanted by earth or heaven. Future? Nil. A second *Capitalist* Party is to-day an unwanted anachronism in British politics. Hope of survival? The Popular Front.

The Popular Front. Fashionable among "progressive" people, but not politically popular and unlikely to come to the front. Only supported by parties with a past, or without a future, i.e. Liberal and Communist Parties. Wrecked from the start by the opposition of the Labour Party.

The Labour Party shares with the Anglican Church and the game of cricket the distinction of being one of our three most "English" institutions. It must be quite incomprehensible to a foreigner. To begin with, it is as innocent of anything in the nature of theory or social philosophy as George Washington was, traditionally, of guile. (cf. any American bourgeois historian 1783-1883.) Yet, concurrently, there is no party in the world which pursues a consistent policy more consistently. Even more than the German Social democracy, 1914-33, the British Labour Party is the classical example of proletarian conservatism, "the aristocracy of Labour." Its real, as distinct from its professed object, is, at all costs, to safeguard the national and international ascendancy of British Capital. It has succeeded Liberalism as

the alternative Party of British political life, because it has the immense advantage of being *in form*, a proletarian party, and, therefore, "bores from within" the working class in a way that a professedly capitalist party—liberal or fascist—could not do. Its value, therefore, to the British ruling class is beyond all price. It does the work of the ruling class for it.

At present—October 1937—the Labour Party is in a very awkward position. Its recent annual conference, Bournemouth, Oct. 4-9, has decided upon a "short-term programme" of the usual reformist type — bigger old-age pensions etc. — but, unfortunately, the prospect of the people living to enjoy them is steadily diminishing, alongside of the rapidly growing menace of a Second World War in the immediate future. "Armaments," therefore, willy-nilly, overshadowed the scene at Bournemouth. Here, the Labour Party—the junior partner of British Imperialism, as it may be accurately styled—voted for adequate measures to defend "our" country and "Commonwealth of Nations," (sic) despite the opposition of some pacifists like Lansbury, and "ultra-left" politicians like Sir Stafford Cripps, who would like to be Marxist, if they only knew how. The decision, however, has effectually lined up the Party behind the Government. This makes it virtually impossible for the Labour Party to win the next General Election — if there is one before the next war, which may be doubted.

Probably, England is already a "totalitarian" state, in the sense that party politics are effectively dead, and that it will now always be unpatriotic to "embarrass"—i.e. oppose in any serious manner — the "National" Government. Probably, "Labour" has only one chance left of again forming part of a British government: as part of the next war-time government of "National Unity," to win — or lose — the next great war of British Imperialism, of which it has always been, in practice, the loyal servant. (Even in the palmy days of Ramsay MacDonald it was never so blatantly reactionary as it is today.)

The Communist Party. Since the domination of Stalin began, the Communist International has marched in (goose) step with such meticulous uniformity that the type of "Communism" in any one country is in exact conformity with its counterpart in any other. "When uncle says: 'Turn,' we all turn." In England "the party line," like the solitary elephant of the humorist, has "dashed off in all directions," with, it may be added, a mechanical enthusiasm that proved equal to every successive "zig-zag." Since Hitler railroaded "the third period" of "social fascism" (which really perished in the Reichstag Fire—the C.P.G.B., along with its brother-parties) or what was left of them elsewhere—went "all hot and bothered" in its passionate ardour for "democracy," (the "social-fascism" of other years) and ever since the last "turn," (1934-5) has been performing the strangest gyrations, alternately seeking to enter the Labour Party by the direct route of affiliation, or, alternatively, when "Labour" put up the shutters, by the circuitous route of the Popular Front. This is a union of all "democrats" against Fascism, the ever present "King Charles' Head," which (possibly because of its marked resemblance to their own mentality) haunts the members of the C.I. and the C.P.G.B. night and day. In England, as elsewhere, the Communist Party has become an "anti-fascist" party exclusively. It has long ceased to be anti-capitalist, and, if only the "National" Government would make up its mind that "Fascism," i.e. German-Italian-Japanese Imperialism, is the proximate enemy of British Imperialism, as, indeed, it probably is, the Communists would whole-heartedly support "democracy" — British Imperialism — in its war for world supremacy against its latest rivals. While, if, as is not unlikely, their mutual interests

create an Anglo-Russian alliance, defence of British Imperialism becomes defence of "the Workers' Fatherland,"—and what more loyal subject has King George than Mister (Sir?) Harry Pollitt?—the comrades will be at the Palace, singing "Rule Britannia" with the best.

In short, the real hero of the Communist Party to-day is neither Marx nor Lenin, but that old Roman bishop who bade his converts "worship everything they had burnt, and burn everything they had worshipped." Unfortunately, the newly found "friends" do not respond. Two reformist proletarian parties are as superfluous as two capitalist ones in the present stage of British life. The Labour Party has numbers, money, and respectability on its side. Even its name is against "Communism." Stalin may, in time, become one of the best people: but Lenin? And Marx?

"*The Left Book Club.*" Strictly, this is not a political party, but a publishing enterprise, run by a slick business man—Mr. Victor Gollancz—who has discovered that revolutions also can enter the sphere of commodity production and become rackets, and that socialism can produce surplus value as well as the next article. (In fact there are rumours that selling imitation-socialism pays this commercial genius much better than the imitation pearls which other businessmen are compelled to sell for a much more modest living.)

In actuality, the Left Book Club is a satellite of the C.P.G.B.—"Bloomsbury Communism" one might style it. Via its agency, "Soviet democracy," a la Russia, seeks to permeate the "middle" classes, thus preparing the way for an eventual Popular Front. (Unfortunately, however, no such organization can hope to thrive without the Labour Party's support. And the Labour leaders see no reason why they should sacrifice their fat jobs in a prospective War Government, the price of their "influence" over the workers, in return for a Communist support—already assured without it.) In its proper sphere, the circulation of books, the L.B.C. deluges the market with stacks of literary chaff and a modicum of wheat. But for the fact that no genuine intellectual could wade through the tomes of "Red Catholicism" (Communist theology) which are its chief output—the Left Book Club might become a force among the "intellectuals." As it is, its chief function is to illustrate that law of dialectics which has it that quantity passes into quality—and vice-versa. Particularly, vice-versa.

The I.L.P. The Independent Labour Party, an openly reformist Party prior to 1932, is now a revolutionary Party. (N.B. As most of its members are Scotsmen, the "r" in "revolution" should be rolled—r-r-r-). While very heterogeneous in composition, one could style it "Trotsky and water" without any very grave inaccuracy. (On the whole, during the last two years, ever since its unfortunate failure to give the workers a lead on the Abyssinian war—until the war had finished—the "water" tends to submerge the "Trotsky.") One must, however, do the I.L.P. the justice to concede that the party is definitely more militant than the parties just enumerated, and is, as far as an outsider can judge, entirely free from the gross "opportunism" — to use a polite term—which characterizes the leading members of these organizations. Its weakness lies in its mixed composition and its muddled policies, e.g., most of the English I.L.Pers claim to be "Marxists", while most of the Scotch ones are Roman Catholics—not necessarily the same thing. As regards policy, the I.L.P. carries on—and advocates lustily—a "Unity campaign" with the "C.P.G.B.", whom it denounces elsewhere as "dangerous counter-revolutionaries," (the phrase is culled from the "*New Leader*," the I.L.P. National organ itself) on account

of its suppression of the Spanish "P.O.U.M.," the presumed murder of Andrés Nin, and its "popular front" policies of class-collaboration. Such a contradictory attitude stultifies the Party as a serious force. None the less, there are more potential socialists in its ranks than in any other of the reformist parties.

Trotskyist ("Marxist-Leninist"). The curious amalgam of scientific socialism and "the great man theory of History" known as "Trotskyism", is represented in Great Britain by three small and mutually suspicious groups, all disputing fiercely as to which Party to permeate. English Trotskyism has, however, one considerable achievement to its credit: I refer to "World Revolution" by the Negro Trotskyist, C.L.R. James, a much better statement of the "Fourth International" position in everything except sheer style than are the works of "the old man" himself.

Such is a brief resumé of the panorama which the English scene discloses. None the less, the real mainsprings of British policy are not to-day to be found inside Britain. They are to be found in the menacing world situation which, more and more, throws its shadow about the British scene. The war policy of British Imperialism forms, accordingly, the subject matter of my next article.

UNDERSTANDING

The intelligent working man or woman, who cannot be satisfied with bohemian make-believe and the leftist romantics of the "literary radicals," should read:

SOCIALISM—48 pp.	10
SOCIALISM AND RELIGION—48 pp.	10
THE S.P.G.B. AND QUESTIONS OF THE DAY—80 pp.	15
WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS—36 pp.	10

Write to S.P.G.B., 42 Great Dover St., London, S.E. 1, England

THE MENACE OF FASCISM

• Integer

I

THE REPORT is that a specter is haunting the world. The specter of fascism.

But what is fascism?

This year, we are told, Vargas in Brazil is fascism, the Mikado is fascism, Franco is fascism, Trotsky and John Dewey are things of fascism. Several years back, Roosevelt's New Deal was said to be fascist, MacDonald's "National" government was fascist or fascist, the Chinese Kuomintang and Chiang-Kai-Shek were fascist, the Jewish Zionist movement was somewhat fascist and the Social-Democratic Parties in Germany and elsewhere constituted the phenomenon of social-fascism. What is fascism?

With a war between "fascist" and "non-fascist" powers staring us in the face, it is unnecessary to elaborate on the importance on finding an answer to this question.

However, the formula describing the situation is not this:

"Two opposing systems of ideas have come into collision. The result is the 'next year's war.'"

Like other social phenomena, wars are not in whole, or even considerably, the product of ideas. Rather, ideas—"fascist" and "anti-fascist" garlands of ideas, systems of ideas, ideologies—are accessory facts that have the part of instruments, of decorations, of protective dressing, serviceable in the making of wars. The same trends, the same relationships, the same social circumstances that cause wars also provide the "fascist" and "anti-

fascist" ideologies that are the instruments and accessories of war.

To describe fascism is to explain an imposing aspect of contemporary capitalism. And to tear away prevailing fancies—innocent or inspired—about the role of fascism, and about the character of the institutions that are built or modified by the action of victorious fascist parties, is to disprove prevailing fashions in misunderstanding the tortuous course of the existing social system.

The Term

"Fascism" and "fascist" do not mean the same as "reaction," "reactionary," "non-democratic." While fascism is anti-democratic and may be considered, from a certain angle, reactionary (the point is dealt with below), not all anti-democratic and reactionary movements and institutions are fascist. Tsarism was not fascism. Kaiserism was not fascism. Japanese political Shintoism is not fascism. The Papacy is something other than fascism. Old Gomez, Machado, Porfirio Diaz, the entire galaxy of past and contemporary Ibero-American dictators, were not and are not fascist. On the other hand, there is something like fascism in Turkey, Austria and Poland, and, as a movement, in the lower ranks of the Japanese army. There is something akin to fascism in the general political scheme of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia and in the principles and methods of the old and present Russian Bolshevik Party.

The vulgar use of "fascist" and "fascism" for "reactionary" and "anti-democratic" has now been reworked (by the international propaganda agency serving one of the major actors in the coming war) to stand for "anti-Soviet" and "anti-Stalin." In other words, "anti-authoritarian" and "democratic!" The hope is to have this labored trick of mob indoctrination succeed as a result of constant repetition of the terms "fascism" and "fascist" used in this special sense. Something similar (but in the reverse) was done in the Dark Ages by the Church militant in regards to the word "Jew". It is a propaganda trick cut to suit the mentality of the individuals in whose mouths the catchword is put. It is obvious that in our investigation we cannot be concerned with such *non-sense*.

The word "fascist" was first used by the Italian movement. It was then applied also to German National Socialism, which approximated to a striking degree the methods, principles and fortunes of its Italian prototype. We apply the terms "fascist" and "fascism" to all political movements that have the chief distinctive features of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.

The Party

A specific feature of the course of capitalist society is the alternate succession of "good" times and "bad" times. The rhythm of this alternation is not regular. It is determined on the world scale by the general development of capitalism but also varies according to the particular conditions of development of the given country or region. The social discontent that is ever present in capitalism increases in bad times. It flares very high when bad times attain the character of a national or world crisis.

This rising and receding discontent feeds a number of political organizations and movements. These compete among themselves for the opportunity to guide the fortunes of society by means of the machinery of government and the State. All political organizations, whether conservative or radical, enter the political arena with the offer to improve the situation in the country. They bid for the support of the population. (This also applies to the so-called dictators and dictatorships). They do that by

presenting sets of promises that measure up to the understanding of those whose support they aim to win.

Whether they are idealistic and sincere or grossly opportunist, the politicians functioning in capitalism must offer to their prospective followers what the latter want, or they cannot hope to attract or hold their backing. The population of capitalist society is interested in the betterment of the conditions under which it lives. The prevailing belief as to what will be effective in improving conditions varies according to the juncture of the situation. Therefore, the politicians of capitalism come forward either with programs calling for sweeping change or conservative caution; programs of international peace and collaboration, or emphatically nationalist aggression against the rest of the world. The circumstances of the political movement decide what program wins a large enough following to bring victory to the politicians manipulating it. The mandate to run the country is always won by the party or movement that accosts the population with a set of promises that find a great echo in the prevailing hopes or illusions. Faced by a completely changed popular outlook, politicians at times reverse their programs completely. Such an about-face was the apparent transformation of Mussolini's Fascist Party, which in 1919 called for the confiscation of "idle capital," and tried to lead the workers' occupation of factories and the peasants' seizure of land, but by 1921 was smashing trade unions and agrarian cooperatives. Yet a party does not usually undergo a complete programmatic change from political contest to political contest.

Programs tend to move along their traditional lines. For while parties appeal for the support of the population at large, they are also the immediate expression of the particular interests or outlook of this or that particular section of the population. We therefore have Labor Parties, Radical Parties, Liberal Parties, Conservative Parties, Agrarian Parties, Socialist Parties, etc. (We find no parties that call themselves "Capitalist.")

The Fascist Party

One of the distinctive features of the Fascist Party is the special emphasis it lays on the fact of its appeal to the population as a whole. It claims to be the Party of the Nation, the Party of the People. It is a Populist Party in a double sense. First, it offers a program of radical social reform that is meant to appeal to all elements of the population. Second, it represents its own rule, its manipulation of the State apparatus it has won, as the expression of the will of the entire people. Here is apparently the incarnation of the ideal born in the French Revolution—the true "National government," the Nation-State. In fact, we have here only the intensification of the tendency, common in capitalist society, to identify real (class and individual) interests with the supposed interests of the "nation" and therefore the interests of the dominant minority of eaters of surplus value. For the national capital facing special difficulties in the arena of the world market, the Fascist Nation-State is a most effective instrument. Its fulfillment of such a service accounts in a way for the birth of the Fascist movement in certain countries, but not in the sense supplied by the Stracheys, Palme Dutts and the other Communist and Laborite sociological romancers. Several, more or less similar, comforting beliefs on Fascism are current among radicals:

1. A fascist movement is the artificial product of the machinations of "finance capital."
2. It is the result of a "broken down proletarian revolution."

3. It is the "revolt of the petty bourgeoisie against the burdens of imperialist capitalism" (Brailsford and Scott Nearing).
4. It is the inevitable last stand of capitalism, by which the capitalist class hopes to save itself from extinction in a threatening "Bolshevist" revolution (Strachey, Dutt and other C.I. publicists before 1934).
5. It is the political expression of the tendency of stagnant capitalism to social-economic retrogression in the direction of feudalistic barbarism (Nearing and Dutt).
6. It is a new social order replacing capitalism, precluding, or at least preceding, the victory of socialism.

It appears almost a waste of time and effort to attempt to show that fascism as a social structure does not signify the replacement of capitalism with a new kind of society, and that it is not an historic reversion to a backward social economic level. But the truth of the matter is that these fanciful theories rise on the top of their companion beliefs. To demonstrate the falseness of such popular tales, we must first consider the significance of fascism as a movement.

Fascism is a nationalist, populist, mass movement of radical social reform within capitalism. As such it rivals the old-style laborite parties and the Bolshevik "communists." As such it is a step-child of the traditional Social-Democracy and a sister to Russian Bolshevism. Let us examine the historic conditions under which fascism arose in Italy and Germany, and the conditions under which it is now arising in other countries.

(Second article in next issue.)

THE NEXT WORLD WAR

• Simone Weil

We are reprinting this revised translation of Simone Weil's essay (under the general title given to the entire series on war) for the following reasons. First: it follows logically Engels' war thesis of 1892 (published in its first English translation in the preceding issue of the International Review). Second: literally hundreds have written us asking for the text of "Simone Weil's work on war." About a year and a half ago, a British society of "war resisters" asked our permission to reprint the essay in installments. As far as we know, the war resisters' publication gave up the ghost soon after the second installment was reproduced. It appears that before they had a chance to read Weil's analysis most of the war resisters became bellicose "anti-fascists." But the demand for "Simone Weil's work on war" continues. The very early issue in which the first version appeared is completely exhausted; and the International Review, not being "anti-fascist" or "fascist", is too poor to find it easy to reprint any of its text in pamphlet form.

While the present reprint serves the second purpose, we present it especially as a component part of our general treatment of the problem of war, preparing the ground for the following articles, which will deal with the position taken by the various sets of political persons presuming to speak for the working people of the world. Our rather timid hope, of course, is that some individual or individuals, preferably possessors of lots of money, will come forward to provide us with the cost of issuing the entire series as a pamphlet. But alas, the ideas presented in the International Review continue to be found uninteresting on the penthouse level. It is up to you, little man.

THE PROBLEM OF WAR is on the order of the day. We are living in the perpetual expectation of war. The prevalent reaction to the situation can be described as that of panic. Not so much the panic of courage before the menace of massacre, as the panic of the mind before the problems posed by the menace. Nowhere is this rout more noticeable than in the labor movement.

We must make a serious effort to analyze the situation facing us. Otherwise the first day of the war will find us impotent not only to act but to judge. And the first thing we must do is to draw up the balance sheet of the traditions that guided our behavior in similar situations before.

Up to the period following the last war, the revolutionary movement, in its various forms, had nothing in common with pacifism. The revolutionary stand on war and peace has always found its inspiration in the memories of the years 1792-3-4, the cradle of the revolutionary trends of the 19th century. In absolute contradiction with historic reality, the war of 1793 appeared as a victorious outburst, which, by ranging the French people against all foreign tyrants, was going to break with the same blow the domination of the Court and the upper bourgeoisie and hand over the power to the representatives of the laboring masses. From this legendary belief, perpetuated by the song *Marseillaise*, flows the conception that a revolutionary war, defensive or offensive, is not only a legitimate form but one of the most glorious forms of the struggle of the toiling masses against their oppressors. This idea appeared to be common to all Marxists and almost all revolutionaries up to about fifteen years ago. In fact, however, the socialist tradition has given us more than one conception of war. It has given us several contradictory ones, which have never been clearly compared and evaluated.

In the first half of the 19th century, war seems to have had a certain prestige in the eyes of the revolutionaries. In France, for example, they vigorously rebuked Louis-Philippe for his peace policy. Proudhon wrote an eloquent eulogy of war. The revolutionaries of the period dreamed not only of insurrections but of wars waged in order to liberate oppressed peoples. The war of 1870 forced the proletarian organizations—that is to say, the International — to take, for the first time, a definite stand on the question of war. By Marx's pen, the International invited the workers of the two combatant countries to show opposition against any attempt at conquest, but it also advised them to participate resolutely in the defence of their country in opposition to any attacking foreign adversary.

It was in behalf of another idea that Engels, in 1892, evoked the memories of a war of exactly one hundred years before when he called on the German social-democrats to fight with all their might in the case of a war of Germany against allied France and Russia. According to him, the matter was no longer one of defence or attack. It was now a question of preserving, either by an offensive or by defence, the country where the working class movement was most powerful. It was a question of crushing the country that was most reactionary. According to this outlook (and it was also that of Plekhanov, Mehring and others) the stand to be taken in a war could be determined by calculating what result would be most favorable to the international proletariat. Sides were to be taken accordingly.

This position is opposed by that of Lenin (the Lenin of 1914-1918, *ed.*), according to whom all but national or revolutionary wars were to be sabotaged by the proletariat in each country. It is also opposed by Rosa Luxemburg, according to whom the proletariat ought to try to sabotage all wars, excepting

revolutionary wars. The last two conceptions, founded on the notion that all wars (save the mentioned exceptions) are imperialist in character and may be compared with quarrels of bandits over the division of their booty, also have their difficulties. For they seem to break the unity of action of the international proletariat by engaging the workers of each country to work for the defeat of their own country and favor at the same time the victory of the imperialist enemy, which, on the other hand, the workers in the opponent country must endeavor to prevent.

Liebknicht's famous formula: "Our enemy is in our country" clearly brings out the chief difficulty when it assigns to the various national fractions of the world proletariat a different enemy and thus, at least in appearance, opposes one section of the proletariat against the other.

It is obvious that on the question of war the Marxist tradition presents neither unity nor clarity. One point was common to all the Marxist trends: the explicit refusal to condemn war as such. Marxists—notably Kautsky and Lenin—willingly paraphrased Clausewitz's formula, according to which war merely continues the politics of peace times. War was to be judged not by the violence of its methods but by the objectives pursued through these methods.

The period following the war did not introduce a new conception of war into the working class movement. One can hardly accuse the labor organizations of our time of having definite ideas on the subject. But the post-war years did introduce a new moral atmosphere. As early as 1918, the Bolshevik party which then wanted a revolutionary war, had to resign itself to peace under the direct pressure of the Russian soldiers, whom the example of 1793 no more inspired with the desire of emulation when evoked by the Bolsheviks than when it was evoked a while ago by Kerenski. Similarly, in other countries, the war-battered masses compelled the parties that leaned on the proletariat to adopt a purely pacific language, which, however, did not prevent some from toasting the Red Army and others from voting war credits for their own country.

It is understood that there was never an attempt made to justify this language theoretically. Nobody ever stopped to remark that there was something new about such an attitude. But the fact is that instead of attacking war because it was imperialist, people began to attack imperialism because it made wars. As a result, the so-called Amsterdam movement, directed in theory against imperialist wars, was obliged, in order to be heard, to present itself as being against war in general. In its propaganda, the pacific inclinations of the U.S.S.R. were emphasized rather than the proletarian character—or that called such—of contemporary Russia. But the formulae of the great theoreticians of socialism on the impossibility of condemning war as such were completely forgotten.

The triumph of Hitler in Germany brought to the surface, so to say, the entire inextricable tangle of the old conceptions. Peace appeared less precious now that it permitted the unspeakable horrors under which thousands of workers were groaning in the German concentration camps. The idea expressed by Engels in his 1892 article reappeared. Is not German fascism the principal enemy of the international proletariat just as Tsarist Russia was in those days? This fascism, spreading like a blotch of oil, can only be erased by force. And since the German proletariat is disarmed, it seems that only the might of the remaining democratic countries can clear away the stain.

Moreover, people said, it is not important to stop to decide whether we are dealing here with a war of defense or a "preventive war." Did not Marx and Engels at one time try to

force England to attack Russia? The coming war can no longer be thought of as a struggle between two imperialist combatants. It is a struggle between two political régimes. And just as was suggested by old Engels in 1892, when he recalled what happened one hundred years before, so it is suggested now: that a war will oblige the State to make serious concessions to the proletariat. Especially since the impending war will necessarily bring a conflict between the State and the capitalist class and, undoubtedly, also advanced measures of socialization. Who knows but the war may automatically carry to power the representatives of the proletariat?¹

All these considerations are beginning to create in the political circles seeking support among the propertyless a current of opinion that is more or less explicitly in favor of an active participation of the workers in a war against Germany. This current is still relatively weak, but it will without doubt swell.² Others stick to the distinction between aggression and national defence. Still others hold fast to Lenin's conception and others, as yet quite numerous, remain pacifists, for the most part from the force of habit. The confusion is great.

The existence of so much uncertainty and obscurity may be found surprising, and almost shameful, considering that we are dealing here with the most characteristic phenomenon of our time. It would be more surprising, however, if we arrived at anything better in face of the persisting influence of the absolutely legendary and illusory tradition of 1793 and in view of the very defective common method of evaluating each war by its supposed ends rather than by the character of the methods employed. And it would not be preferable to put the blame on the practice of violence in general, as does the pure pacifist. In each epoch war constitutes a clearly determined species of violence, the mechanism of which we must study before we can form any opinion. The materialist method consists above all in the act of examining all social acts in accordance with a procedure that seeks to discover the consequences necessarily implied in the working out of the methods employed instead of taking the avowed ends of the human acts in question at their face value. One cannot solve nor even state a problem relating to war without first taking into account the mechanism of the military struggle, that is, without first analyzing the social relationships implied by war under the given technical, economic and social conditions.

We can speak of war in general only abstractly. Modern war differs absolutely from anything designated by that name under previous régimes. On the one hand, war is only a projection of the other war which bears the name of competition and which has made of production a simple form of struggle for domination. On the other hand, all economic life now ever moves toward an impending war. In this inextricable mixture of the military and economic, where arms are put at the service of competition and production is put at the service of war, war merely reproduces the social relationships constituting the very structure of the existing order—but to a more acute degree.

Marx has shown forcefully that the modern method of production consists essentially of the subordination of the workers to the instruments of labor, which are disposed of by those who do not work. He has shown how competition, knowing no other weapon than the exploitation of the workers, is transformed

¹This is essentially the content of Trotsky's latest war advice to his French followers, a scheme, very similar to Plekhanov's 1914 stand on war, according to which the Russian revolutionaries were going to arrive at power by supporting the Tsar against the Kaiser.

²This was written in 1934.

into a struggle of each employer against his own workmen and, in the last analysis, of the entire class of employers against their employees.

In the same way, war in our days is distinguished by the subordination of the combatants to the instruments of combat, and the armaments, the true heroes of modern warfare, as well as the men dedicated to their service, are directed by those who do not fight. And since this directing apparatus has no other way of fighting the enemy than by sending its own soldiers, under compulsion, to their death—the war of one State against another State resolves itself into a war of the State and the military apparatus against its own army.

War in the last analysis appears as a struggle led by all the State apparatuses and their general staffs against all men old enough and able to bear arms. But while the machine used in production takes from the worker only his labor power and while employers have no other weapon of constraint than dismissal—a weapon that is somewhat blunted by the existence of the possibility for the worker to choose among different employers—each soldier is forced to sacrifice his very life to the needs of the total military machine. He is forced to do so under the menace of execution without the benefit of a trial, which the State power holds over his head. In view of this, it makes little difference whether the war is offensive or defensive, imperialist or nationalist. Every State is obliged to employ this method since the enemy also employs it.

The great error of nearly all studies of war, an error into which all socialists have fallen, has been to consider war as an episode in foreign politics, when it is especially an act of interior politics, and the most atrocious act of all.

We are not concerned here with sentimental considerations or with a superstitious respect for human life. We are concerned here with a very simple fact, that massacre is the most radical form of oppression and that soldiers do not merely expose themselves to death but are sent to death. And since every apparatus of oppression, once constituted, remains such until it is shattered, every war that places the weight of a military apparatus over the masses, forced to serve it in its manœuvres, must be considered a factor of reaction, even though it may be led and directed by revolutionists. As for the exterior compass of such a war, that is determined by the political relationships established in the interior. Arms wielded by the apparatus of the sovereign State cannot bring liberty to anybody.

That is what Robespierre came to understand and that is what was verified so brilliantly by the war of 1792, the war that gave birth to the notion of revolutionary wars.

At that time, military technique was far from reaching the degree of centralization of our days. Yet, after Frederick II, the subordination of the soldiers, charged with carrying out the war operations, to the high command, charged with coordinating these operations, was quite strict. At the time of the French Revolution, war was going to transform France, as Barrère put it, into a vast camp, and as a result give to the State apparatus the power without appeal usually held by military authority. And such was the calculation made by the Court and the Girondins in 1792. For this war—which a legend so easily accepted by socialists has made appear as a spontaneous outburst of the mass aroused against its oppressors and at the same time against the foreign tyrants menacing the mass—was in fact a provocation on the part of the Court and the upper bourgeoisie, united in a plot against the liberties of the people.

In appearance the Court and the Girondins had made a mistake. For instead of bringing the Holy Alliance, for which they

hoped, the war sharpened all conflicts and sent the king and then the Girondins to the guillotine and put dictatorial power into the hands of the Montagne. But this does not negate the fact that on the 20th of April, 1792, the day of the declaration of war, all hope for democracy foundered. The second of June was followed but too soon by the 9th of Thermidor, which, in turn, served to usher in the 18th of Brumaire. Of what good was to Robespierre and his friends the power they exercised before the 9th of Thermidor? Their aim was not merely to seize power. Their aim was to establish an effective democracy, a régime both social and democratic. By the bloody irony of history, the war forced them to leave on paper the Constitution of 1793. It forced them to exercise a bloody reign of terror, which they could not even turn against the rich. It forced them to destroy all liberty. It forced them, in short, to prepare the way for the bourgeois, bureaucratic and military despotism of Napoleon.

But the revolutionaries of 1792 at least remained clear-headed. On the eve of his death, Saint-Just wrote this profound sentence: "Only those who are in battles win them, and only those who are powerful profit from them."

As for Robespierre, as soon as he faced the question, he understood that war, powerless to free any foreign people ("one does not bring liberty at the point of the bayonet"), would hand over the French people to the chains of State power, a power that one could not attempt to weaken at the time when it was imperative to struggle against the foreign enemy. "War is good for military officers, for the ambitious, for money-jobbers . . . for the executive power . . . The condition of war settles for the State all other cares; one is quits with the people as soon as war is given to it." He very soon foresaw the coming military despotism. He never ceased to point this out despite the apparent successes of the Revolution. He again predicted it in his death speech. He left this prediction after him as a testament to which those who have since made use of his name have unfortunately paid no attention.

The history of the Russian revolution furnishes the same data, and with a striking analogy. The Soviet Constitution met the same fate as the Constitution of 1793. Like Robespierre, Lenin abandoned the democratic doctrines he assumed at the time of the revolution to establish the despotism of the apparatus of a centralized State. He was the precursor of Stalin, just as Robespierre was the precursor of Bonaparte. There is a difference. Lenin had prepared this domination of the State apparatus by forging a strongly centralized party. He deformed his own doctrines in order to adapt them to the needs of the hour. Moreover, he was not guillotined, but became the idol of a new State religion.

The history of the Russian Revolution is the more striking because war constitutes its central problem. The revolution was made, as a movement against war, by soldiers who, feeling the government and military apparatus go to pieces over them, hastened to shake off an intolerable yoke. Invoking, with an involuntary sincerity due to his ignorance, the memory of 1792, Kerensky appealed to the soldiers to continue the war for exactly the same reasons as were given by the Girondins before. Trotsky has admirably shown how the bourgeoisie, counting on war to adjourn the problems of interior politics and to lead back the people under the yoke of State power, wanted to transform "the war till the exhaustion of the enemy into a war for the exhaustion of the Revolution."

The Bolsheviks then called for a struggle against imperialism.

But it was war itself and not imperialism that was in question. They saw this well when, once in power, they were obliged to sign the peace of Brest-Litovsk. The old army was then broken up. Lenin repeated with Marx that the dictatorship of the proletariat could tolerate neither a permanent army, police or bureaucracy. But the 'white armies and the fear of foreign intervention soon put the whole of Russia into a state of siege. The army was then reconstituted, the election of officers suppressed, thirty thousand officers of the old regime reinstated in the cadres, the death penalty, the usual discipline and centralization reestablished. Parallel with this, came the reconstitution of the police, and the bureaucracy. We know what this military, bureaucratic and police apparatus has consequently done to the Russian people.

Revolutionary War is the grave of revolution. And it will be that as long as the soldiers themselves, or rather the armed citizenry, are not given the means of waging war without a directing *apparatus*, without police pressure, without exceptional jurisdiction, without punishment for deserters. Once in modern history was a war carried on in this manner—under the Commune. Everybody knows with what results. It seems that revolution engaged in war has only the choice of either succumbing under the murderous blows of counter-revolution or transforming itself into counter-revolution through the very mechanism of the military struggle.

The perspectives of a revolution seem therefore quite restricted. For can a revolution avoid war? It is, however, on this feeble chance that we must stake everything or abandon all hope. An advanced country will not encounter, in case of revolution, the difficulties which in backward Russia served as a base for the barbarous regime of Stalin. But a war of any range will give rise to difficulties that are formidable.

For mighty reasons a war undertaken by a bourgeois State cannot but transform power into despotism and subjection into assassination. If war sometimes appears as a revolutionary factor, it is only in the sense that it constitutes an incomparable test for the functioning of the State. In contact with war, a badly organized apparatus collapses. But if the war does not end soon, or if it starts up again, or if the decomposition of the State has not gone far enough, the situation results in revolutions, which, according to Marx's formula, perfect the State apparatus instead of shattering it. That is what has always happened up to now.

In our time the difficulty developed by war to a high degree is especially that resulting from the ever growing opposition between the State apparatus and the capitalist system. The Brie affair during the last war provides us with a striking example. The last war brought to several State apparatuses a certain authority over economic matters. (This gave rise to the quite erroneous term of "War Socialism.") Later the capitalist system returned to an almost normal manner of functioning, in spite of custom barriers, quotas and national monetary systems. There is no doubt that in the next war things will go a little farther. We know that quantity can transform itself into quality. In this sense, war can constitute a revolutionary factor in our time, but only if one wants to give the term "revolution" the meaning given to it by the Nazis.

Like the crisis, war will provoke a lively hostility against the capitalists. This hostility, manipulated by the Holy Alliance, will benefit the State apparatus and not the workers. Furthermore, in order to recognize the kinship tying the phenomenon of war to that of fascism, it suffices to turn to the fascist texts, which tirelessly evoke the "warrior spirit" and the "socialism

of the front." In both cases, we are dealing with the total effacement of the individual before the State bureaucracy through the instrumentality of an exasperated fanaticism. If the capitalist system finds itself more or less damaged in the affair, it will be only at the expense, and not to the advantage of human values and the proletariat—if demagoguery goes as far as it can in certain cases.

The absurdity of an anti-fascist struggle which chooses war as its means of action thus appears quite clear. Not only would this mean to fight barbarous oppression by crushing peoples under the weight of even more barbarous massacre. It would actually mean spreading under another form the very régime that we want to suppress. It is childish to suppose that a State apparatus rendered powerful by a victorious war would lighten the oppression exercised over its own people by the enemy State apparatus. It is even more childish to suppose that the victorious State apparatus would permit a proletarian revolution to break out in the defeated country without drowning it immediately in blood. As for bourgeois democracy being annihilated by fascism, a war would not do away with this threat but would reinforce and extend the causes that now render it possible.

It seems that, generally speaking, history obliges every political action to choose between aggravating the oppression exercised by the various State apparatuses and carrying on a merciless struggle against these apparatuses in order to shatter them. Indeed, the almost insoluble difficulties presenting themselves nowadays almost justify the pure and simple abandonment of the struggle. But if we are not to renounce all action, we must understand that we can struggle against the State apparatus only inside the country. And notably in case of war, we must choose between hindering the functioning of the military machine of which we are ourselves so many cogs and blindly aiding that machine to continue to crush human lives.

Thus Liebknecht's famous words: "The principal enemy is in our own country" take on their full significance and are revealed to be applicable to all wars in which soldiers are reduced to the condition of passive matter in the hands of a bureaucratic and military apparatus. This means that as long as the present war technique continues, these words apply to any war, absolutely speaking. And in our time we can not foresee the advent of another technique. In production as in war, the increasingly collective manner with which forces are operated has not modified the essentially individual functions of decision and management. It has only placed more and more of the hands and lives of the mass at the disposal of the commanding apparatuses.

As long as we do not perceive that it is possible to avoid in the very act of production or of fighting, the domination of an apparatus over the mass, so long every revolutionary tentative will have in it something of the hopeless. For if we do know what system of production and combat we aspire with all our heart to destroy, we do not know what acceptable system could replace it. Furthermore, every attempt at reform appears puerile in face of the blind necessities implied in the operation of the monstrous social machine. For present society resembles an immense machine that ceaselessly snatches and devours human beings and which no one knows how to master. And they who sacrifice themselves for social progress resemble persons who try to catch hold of the wheels and the transmission belts in order to stop the machine and are destroyed in their attempts.

But the helplessness in which we find ourselves at present, an helplessness which must never be regarded as unchanging, cannot exempt us from keeping faith with ourselves. It cannot excuse capitulation to the enemy, no matter what mask he as-

sumes. No matter what is the name by which the enemy adorns himself—fascism, democracy or “dictatorship of the proletariat”—the main enemy still remains the administrative, the police and the military apparatus. Not the apparatus that is in front of us—that is only as much our enemy as it is the enemy of our brothers—but the apparatus, over us and in back of us, the monster that says it is our defender and makes of us its slaves. No matter under what circumstances, the worst possible treason consists in accepting subordination to this apparatus and trampling, in order to serve it, all human values in ourselves and others.

books

MUSSOLINI A LA CONQUISTA DE LOS BALEARES.

By Camillo Berneri. Published by “Tierra y Libertad,” Barcelona.

REVIEWED BY E. L. ROOF

The book ends with the following—interrupted—conclusion: “This conclusion can be neither an epilog nor a synthesis. The facts presented and the documents reproduced speak clearly enough to enable the reader to form his own judgment.

“The imperialist megalomania of the Italian dictatorship can reach its apex with the policy of allowing Mussolini the liberty of action in Spain. Fascist domination in the Mediterranean is becoming a fact and Mussolini may be able to raise Egypt against England, and Tunis, Algeria and Morocco against France, while it strengthens its own colonial domination in Tripolitania and Ethiopia.

“I have happened to put together all these documents. This book is only a dossier that I put at the disposal of public opinion. I have not been impartial; I have been a proscribed exile for more than fifteen years, and I took part in the struggle. But I find applicable to this book the famous aphorism by Professor Gaetano Salvemini: ‘Impartiality is a dream; honesty is a duty.’

“However, I have held such documents in my hands, that with a little of journalistic cleverness I should have been able to make of my book-dossier a pamphlet of real scandal. But I have preferred to remain honest, even scrupulously honest. I do not pretend to have produced an historic work. But I have the certainty of having well utilized documents, collected after some effort in the archives of the Royal Consulate-General in Barcelona, with the scientific scrupulousness of an honest writer of history.”

And there you have a pretty good description of this interesting little book, which is in its straightforward way a demonstration of what and who was Berneri. *Mussolini's Conquest of the Balearics* is really only the project of a work on the subject. On the 5th of May, while he was working on his book, Berneri was kidnapped from his home. The body of Berneri, together with that of his room-mate, was found near the Palace of the Generalidad. Berneri's body was shot and slashed full of holes. The night before, on the 4th of May (during the provocative May putsch made by the representatives of the USSR in Spain, for the purpose of cleaning out all dangerous radicals that might have made the situation unsafe for the Laval-Stalin pact), the Communists took care to dispose of Berneri. The Stalinist guardians of democracy and the social status-quo must have found him an easy victim. Berneri was extremely myopic, and though only 40 years old, was very much unlike our dashing literary crusaders for democracy and civilization, say, as tough, bluff, human Ernest Hemingway. Faced by the lynching mob of armed

bourgeois-Stalinists, with perhaps an International Brigader or two among them, Berneri must have recognized the end reserved for him, Roselli, and their kind, by the Mussolinis and Stalins.

Berneri, originally a professor of philosophy, was one of the very learned ‘men of our time. He refused to swear fealty to the fascist regime while he was a professor at the University of Carmona. He had extreme contempt for all kinds of fascism. The obscene vulgarity of the political philosophies and methods of behavior represented by Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler used to make him smile. He must have smiled at his executioners.

His *Anti-Semite Jew* was summarized in the first number of the International Review. When July 19 burst forth, he ran to offer himself to anti-fascist Spain. Unfitted by his near-blindness for action at the front, he helped with his pen. *Mussolini's Conquest* is one of his contributions to the anti-fascist propaganda. He was one of the first to recognize the trap the Spanish anti-fascists found themselves in as a result of the diplomatic card game played by the Powers. He said what he knew. That is why he was killed. The political essays he wrote during the several months before his assassination are very important analyses of the Spanish situation. The best monument to Berneri that could be suggested to the notice of De Santillan (who writes the preface) would be a collection of those essays. But I doubt if friend De Santillan and his set quite approved of Berneri's political essays. They told the bitter truth.

MARX AND THE STATE

• Martov

With this installment we end the reproduction in the International Review of the first English translation of Martov's work on STATE AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION. Two chapters remain unpublished. It has been suggested to us to publish Martov in book or pamphlet form. Several small sums of money have been offered to us for that purpose. May we hear from all readers who are interested in seeing Martov's works appear as a book?

The present work appears in the following issues of the International Review: Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 of Vol. II, and in the current number.

THE PROUDHONISTS and the Anarchists were not greatly devoted to the study of economics. They had a naive, almost simplistic, conception of what would follow the seizure of the means of production by the working class. They did not realize that capitalism has created, for the concentration of the means of production and exchange, so huge an apparatus, that in order to lay hold of these means, the working class would require effective administrative machinery extending over the entire economic domain that was previously ruled by capital. They had no idea of the immenseness and complexity of the transformation that would come as a result of a social revolution. And only because they did not understand all these things was it possible for them to imagine the autonomous “commune” — itself based on “autonomous” productive units—as the lever of such a transformation.

Marx was well aware of the preponderant role played by Anarcho-Proudhonism in the movement that brought forth the Paris Commune. In a letter to Engels (June 30, 1866), he refers ironically to the “Proudhonian Stirnerianism,” which is inclined to “decompose everything into small groups or communes that are expected to come together again in a certain

kind of union, but of course, not in a State." (*Correspondence*, vol. III.)

In 1871, however, Marx faced the task of defending the Paris Commune against its enemies, who were drowning it in blood. He faced the task of justifying, in the shape of the Commune, the first attempt of the proletariat to seize power. If it had not been crushed by exterior forces, this effort would have led the workers beyond its first aims and shattered the narrow ideological bounds that repressed its vigor and denatured its content.

We can, therefore, understand why in his apology of the Commune Marx could not even pose the question: Is the realization of socialism conceivable within the framework of autonomous, city and rural, communes? In the presence of the existing division of labor, economic centralization and the degree of development of the powerful means of production that were already attained at that time, the very posing of the question would have been tantamount to rejecting categorically the claim that the autonomous commune could "solve the social question."

We can understand why Marx avoided the question if a Federalist union of communes can assure systematic social production on the scale customary to the preceding capitalism. We can understand why Marx touches only lightly on one of the most serious problems of the social revolution: the relationship between the city and the country, and merely declares, without any supporting evidence, that "the Communal Constitution (organization) would bring the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there secure to them, in the working man, the natural defenders of their interests." But would it be possible to hold the socialist economy in the framework of a federation of autonomous communes while this federation permitted the economic direction of the country by the city?

Marx could "adjourn" all these questions. He could assume that such problems would automatically find their solution in the process of the social revolution and would, at the same time, cast out the Anarcho-Communist illusions that prevailed in the minds of the workers at the beginning.

But Marx did not merely remain silent on such contradictions of the Paris Commune. It is undeniable that he attempted to solve them by recognizing the Commune as "the finally discovered political form, permitting the economic emancipation of labor," and thus contradicted his own principle that the lever of the social revolution can only be the conquest of *State power*.

"The Communal Constitution," declared Marx, "would have restored to the social body the forces hitherto absorbed by the parasite feeding upon and clogging the free movement of society." (*Civil War in France*.)

"The very existence of the Commune, as a matter of course, led to local municipal liberty but no longer as a counter-weight against the power of the State, which thenceforward became useless." (Our emphasis.)

Thus, the "destruction of the bureaucratic and military machine" of the State, dealt with in Marx's letter to Kugelmann, changed imperceptibly and came to stand for the suppression of all State power, of any apparatus of compulsion in the service of the social administration. The destruction of the "power of the modern State," the Continental type of State, became the destruction of the State as such.

Are we in the presence of an intentional lack of precision, enabling Marx to gloss over, in silence, the weak points of the Paris Commune at a moment when the Commune was being trampled by triumphant reaction? Or did the mighty surge of

the revolutionary proletariat of Paris, set in motion under the flag of the Commune, render acceptable to Marx certain ideas of Proudhonian origin? No matter what is the case, it is true that Bakounin and his friends concluded that in his *Civil War in France*, Marx approved of the social revolutionary path traced by them. So that in his memoirs, James Guillaume (Guillaume: *The International*, (vol. II, p. 191) observes with satisfaction that in its appreciation of the Commune the General Council of the International (under whose auspices *Civil War* was published) adopted in full the viewpoint of the Federalists. And Bakounin announced triumphantly: "The Communist revolution had so mighty an effect that despite their logic and real inclinations, the Marxists—with all their ideas overthrown by the Commune—were obliged to bow before the insurrection and appropriate its aims and program." Such statements are not free from exaggeration. But they contain a grain of truth.

It is these, not very precise, opinions of Marx on the destruction of the State by a proletarian insurrection and the creation of the Commune that Lenin recognizes as the basis of the new social-revolutionary doctrine he presumes to reveal. On the top of these opinions of Marx, Lenin raises the Anarcho-Syndicalist canvas, picturing the destruction of the State as the immediate result of the conquest of the dictatorship by the proletariat, and replacing the State with that "finally discovered political form," which in 1871 was embodied in the Commune and is represented today by the "soviets"—since "the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, in different surroundings and under different circumstances, have been continuing the work of the Commune and have been confirming Marx's analysis of history." (*State and Revolution*, page 53, Russian text.)

Already in 1899, in his well-known *Principles of Socialism*, Eduard Bernstein observed that in the *Civil War* Marx appears to have taken a step toward Proudhon. "In spite of all points of difference that existed between Marx and the 'petty bourgeois' Proudhon, it is nevertheless true that on this question their currents of thought resemble each other as closely as possible." Bernstein's words throw Lenin into a great fit of anger. "Monstrous! Ridiculous! Renegade!" shouts Lenin at Bernstein, and he takes the opportunity to revile Plekhanov and Kautsky for not correcting "this perversion of Marx by Bernstein" at the time when they polemicized against Bernstein's book.¹

But Lenin could have attacked on the same count the "Spartakist" Franz Mehring, who was unquestionably the best student and commentator of Marx. In his *Karl Marx: The History of His Life* (Leipzig, 1918), Mehring declares explicitly, leaving no room for doubt:

"As ingenious as were some of Marx's arguments (on the Commune), they were to a certain extent, in contradiction with the conceptions championed by Marx and Engels for a quarter of a century and previously formulated by them in the Communist Manifesto.

"According to these conceptions, the decomposition of the political organization that is referred to as the 'State' evidently belongs among the final accomplishments of the coming proletarian revolution. It will be a progressive decomposition. That organization has always had as its principal purpose to assure, with the aid of the armed forces, the economic oppression of the working majority by a privileged minority. The disappearance of the privileged minority will do away with the

¹Of course, Lenin, too, wrote a great deal on the subject of Eduard Bernstein's book, without taking the trouble of correcting that "perversion."

need of the armed force of oppression, that is, State power. But at the same time Marx and Engels emphasized that in order to achieve this—as well as other, even more important, results—the working class will first have to possess itself of the organized political power of the State and use it for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the capitalists and recreating society on a new basis. *It is difficult to reconcile the General Council's lavish praise of the Paris Commune for commencing with the destruction of the parasitic State and the conceptions presented in the Communist Manifesto.*" (Page 460. Our emphasis.)

And Mehring adds: "One can easily guess that Bakounin's disciples have utilized the address of the General Council in their own fashion."

Mehring is of the opinion that Marx and Engels clearly saw the contradiction existing between the theses presented in the *Civil War* and their previous way of posing the question as that of the conquest of State power. Mehring writes: "Thus, when, after Marx's death, Engels had the occasion to combat the Anarchist tendencies, he, for his part at least, repudiated these reservations and resumed integrally the old conceptions found in the Manifesto."

What are the "old conceptions found in the Manifesto?" They are the following:

The working class seizes the State machinery forged by the bourgeoisie.

It *democratizes* this machinery from top to bottom. (See the immediate measures which, according to the Manifesto, the proletariat of that time would have had to enact when it seized power.) It thus transforms the machinery formerly used by the minority for the oppression of the majority into a machine of constraint exercised by the majority over the minority, with a view of freeing the majority from the yoke of social inequality. That means, as Marx wrote in 1852, not merely "to seize the available ready machinery of the State" of the bureaucratic, police and military type, but to *shatter* that machine in order to construct a new one on the basis of the self-administration of the people guided by the proletariat.

Lenin served himself with the inexact formulae found in *Civil War in France*. These formulae were sufficiently motivated by the immediate need of the General Council to defend the Commune (directed by the Hébertists and the Proudhonists) against its enemies. But they did away almost completely with the margin existing between the thesis of the "conquest of political power" presented by the Marxists and the idea of the "destruction of the State" held by the Anarchists. On the eve of the revolution of October 1917, in his struggle against the republican democratism practiced by the socialist parties he opposed, Lenin used these formulae with such good effect that he accumulated in his theses of *State and Revolution* as many contradictions as were found in the heads of all the members of the Commune: Jacobins, Blanquists, Hébertists, Proudhonians and Anarchists. Objectively, this was necessary (unrealized without doubt by Lenin himself) so that an attempt to create a State machine *very similar* in its structure to the former military and bureaucratic type and controlled by a few adherents² might be presented to the masses, who were then in a condition of revolutionary animation, as the destruction of the old State machinery, as the rise of a society based on a minimum of repression and discipline, as the birth of a *Stateless* society. At

the moment when the revolutionary masses expressed their emancipation from the centuries yoke of the old State by forming "autonomous republics of Kronstadt" and trying Anarchist experiments such as "workers' control," etc.—at that moment, the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasants" (said to be incarnated in the real dictatorship of the supposed "true" interpreters of the proletariat and the poorest peasants: the chosen of Bolshevik Communism) could only consolidate itself by first dressing itself in such Anarchist and anti-State ideology. The formula of "All Power to the Soviets" was found to be most appropriate to express mystically a tendency that agitated the revolutionary elements of the population at that time. This slogan presented to the revolutionary elements of the population two contradictory aims: 1. the creation of a machine that would crush the exploiting classes in the benefit of the exploited; but 2. which would, at the same time, free the exploited from *any* State machinery presupposing the need of subordinating their wills as individuals or groups to the will of the social entity.

No different in origin and significance is the "Soviet mysticism" now current in Western Europe (1919).

In Russia itself the evolution of the "Soviet State" has already created a new and very complicated State machine based on the "administration of persons" as against the "administration of things," based on the opposition of "administration" to "self-administration" and the functionary (official) to the citizen. These antagonisms are in no way different from the antagonisms that characterize the capitalist class State.

The economic retrogression that appeared during the World War has *simplified* economic life in all countries. One of the results of this simplification has been the eclipse, in the consciousness of the masses, of the problem of the organization of production by the problem of distribution and consumption. This phenomenon encourages in the working class the rebirth of illusions that make it believe in the possibility of laying hold of the national economy by handing over the means of production directly—without the aid of the State—to groups of workers ("worker control," "direct socialization," etc.)

From the ground provided by such economic illusions, we see rise again the fallacy that the liberty of the working class can be accomplished by the *destruction* of the State and not by the *conquest* of the State. This belief throws back the revolutionary working class movement toward the confusion, indefiniteness and low ideological level that characterized it at the time of the Commune of 1871.

On one hand, such illusions are manipulated by certain extremist minorities of the socialist proletariat. On the other hand, these groups are themselves the slaves of these illusions. It is under the influence of this double factor that these minorities act when they seek to find a practical medium by which they might elude the difficulties connected with the realization of a real class dictatorship—difficulties that have increased as the class in question has lost its unity in the course of the war and is not capable of giving battle immediately with a revolutionary aim. Fundamentally, the Anarchist illusion of the destruction of the State covers up the tendency to concentrate all the State power of constraint in the hands of a minority, which believes neither in the objective logic of the revolution nor in the class consciousness of the proletarian majority and, with still greater reason, that of the national majority.

The idea that the "Soviet system" is equal to a definitive break with all the former, bourgeois, forms of revolution, there-

²Let us recall that Lenin said that if 200,000 proprietors could administer an immense territory in their own interests, 200,000 Bolsheviks would do the same thing in the interest of the workers and peasants.

fore, serves as a screen behind which — imposed by exterior factors and the inner conformation of the proletariat—there are set going again methods that have featured the bourgeois revolutions. And those revolutions have always been accomplished by transferring the power of a "conscious minority, supporting itself on an unconscious majority," to another minority finding itself in an identical situation.

SOURCES OF BOLSHEVISM

• Sprenger

(Continued from previous issue)

In other words, the class movement of the Russian proletariat was to be subjected to the Russian intelligentsia. Nachimson, referring to the proletarian strike movement of his time in his comment on Pashitnov's *The Condition of the Working Class in Russia*, wrote:

"For the democratic intelligentsia these strikes were especially important because since 1896 it strove toward the proletariat, having recognized in the workers a stronger fighter against Tsarism." (Page 274.)

An idea similar to Axelrod's was expressed by Cherevanin in his pamphlet *The Proletariat and the Russian Revolution*. And finally the delegation of the Russian Social-democracy declared in its report to the International Socialist Congress in 1904:

"... The Russian social democracy came into being primarily as an organization of revolutionary intellectuals who were disappointed with the previous methods used in their fight for liberty and who arrived at the understanding that in the capitalistically developing Russia only the proletariat could offer them a sure support in their struggle against Tsarism." (Page 41.)

The Russian social-democracy discovered the proletariat as the only mass force of the Russian revolution that was capable of action. The turn that took place with this discovery was unprecedented in Russia. By it, the beached anti-Tsarist movement could again be set in motion. But as long as it did not abandon, in theory and practice, the old Bakuninist-Narodnik thesis of a general staff formed of intellectuals and a people's revolutionary army, subjected to that general staff, the turn was merely a tactical turn.

Anything else was impossible as long as the revolutionary intelligentsia were the commanding staff of the social-democratic circles. And at the time of the formation of the Russian social-democracy, there was hardly a suspicion of the decisive character of this question.

The social-democrats asserted that it was necessary and unavoidable for the "revolutionaries" to win the peasant and proletarian masses, which would be led forward into revolution by the "revolutionaries." Therefore they made no fundamental differentiation between activity among the peasants and among the workers. Plekhanov, for example, wrote in 1884, in his book *Our Differences of Opinion*, by which he marked his complete transition to the social-democratic ideology, that the antagonisms between the propagandists working in the villages and the terrorists active in the cities could be overcome precisely through the formation of a "Labor Party." The strife between the village and city revolutionists was going to disappear as the political struggle in the cities took on a worker character. Then the two

groups would differ only according to their place of activity and not according to the nature of their activity. They would then be two representative forms of one popular movement.

The "Labor Party" was expected to bring political strength to the intelligentsia and direct it in one line. According to this line, the work among the city proletariat would be no more than a branch of the general movement. The representation, the leadership, of this movement was to remain the task of the intellectuals, who also in Plekhanov's original conception were to form the commanding staff of the revolution.

Axelrod expressed the same idea in his discussion of the political tasks of the Russian intelligentsia in the *Neue Zeit* of 1898. He declared that the "ideological elements of our upper classes" could not stop at mere propaganda activity but had to direct the aroused revolutionary energies of the "popular masses" toward political action:

"Predestined, so to speak, for this historic task are the proletarianized strata of the intelligentsia, the student youth, as well as the great majority of the spirited and democratic representatives of our intelligent citizenry."

While he stressed the leadership of the popular masses by the intellectuals, he presented at the same time the significance of the proletariat for the purposes of the intelligentsia:

"Naked reality points for the revolutionary intellectuals to the industrial proletariat as the class in which the organization of a revolutionary people's movement has the best chance of success."

And Lenin, too, in his 1897 treatise on *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democracy* placed the proletariat in a central position only "because the latter shows the greatest susceptibility to social-democratic ideas, the highest intellectual and political maturity, and, thanks to its numbers and concentration in the largest focal centers of our country, decides the outcome of the battle." (*Collected Works*, vol. I, page 363.)

He explained at the same time that the social-democracy had to support the propaganda activity of other forces in the villages, since it could not, by reason of its numerical weakness, undertake this itself. *The social-democratic circles continued the old going-to-the-people*. But they turned mostly to the workers instead of the peasants. Their activity was more than anything else the contemporary continuation of the work of the Narodniki. The Marxist theory adopted by them was nothing more than an ideological garb for this task, a covering that helped to tide the revolutionary intelligentsia over a period they could not cope with. Otherwise, the Russian social-democracy and especially Bolshevism moved straight along the political line set by the Narodnik movement.

THE IDEA OF the revolutionary general staff was first expressed by Bakunin, who should be described by Lenin's disciples as the "grandfather of Bolshevism."

Pokrovsky remarks in his *History of Russia*:

"Certain features of revolutionary organization which later found a definite form in the Bolshevik Party were already noticeable in the sixties, when we can already observe the conspiratorial relationship, the systematic program of activity and the choice of insurrection as a method of action." (Page 206.)

Pokrovsky considers as especially Bolshevik, Nechayev's scheme of insurrection, which was going to be realized with aid of a strictly professional-revolutionary organization. Pokrovsky writes that in the Russian revolutionary circles of the sixties there was

formulated a plan, which was "later derided by the Mensheviks, but was actually applied on November 7, 1917. It was literally the plan of the finally realized Revolution." (Page 205.)

The centralized, conspiratorial organization was, however, never attained by the Bakuninists. Supporting himself on the moralistic injunctions found in Bakunin's revolutionary catechism, Nechayev juggled before his master and his comrades the guise of a non-existent organization. The Narodniki were, in fact, the first to apply Bakunin's plan. Ten years before the birth of the Populists' terrorist organization, Bakunin formulated the viewpoint calling for the total subordination of the revolutionaries to the central leadership of their party. In his *Oath of the Active Brothers* of his secret *Alliance*, we read:

"I swear by my honor and life that I agree fully with all the philosophic, economic and social, theoretic and practical, principles of your revolutionary catechism. I submit myself, without exception, to all the orders contained in your manual of regulations. I reserve my duty and right to oppose in discussion at the next assembly all secondary points on which I may hold a different opinion, but I accept beforehand the definitive and supreme decision of the organization."

"From now on I subordinate my entire activity, public and private, political, professional and social, to the supreme guidance I shall receive from the Councils of this Society."

At first, such "Bolshevist" ideas of discipline had as little influence on the political movement of the Russian intelligentsia as the injunctions of absolute scrupulousness contained in Bakunin's "revolutionary catechism." The radical intellectuals turned to the ideas of Lavrov, who proposed peaceful propaganda. But soon Tkachev arose to oppose Lavrov with Jacobinical and Blanquist projects. The State power was to be seized by a determined revolutionary minority. To attain this aim, this revolutionary minority was going to organize itself illegally, subjecting its members to strict discipline, without initiating all of them in the secrets of the organization. With such preparation, the organization would finally set loose a general terror.

For Tkachev, the revolutionary intelligentsia played a decisive role:

"Neither now nor in the future is the people, left to itself, capable of accomplishing the social revolution. Only we, the revolutionary minority, can and must accomplish the revolution, as soon as possible . . . The people cannot help itself. The people cannot direct its own faith to suit its true needs. It cannot give body and life to the ideas of the social revolution." "This role and mission belong, unquestionably, to the revolutionary minority."

The position presented by Tkachev was going to serve as a guide line to the Narodniki terrorists and after them to the Bolsheviks. It did not find an immediate echo in Lavrov's propagandist circles. At that moment, Michailov and Nathanson were organizing the "going-to-the-people." But the repressive measures of the Tsarist government drove the revolutionaries to terrorism. After a few years, Tkachev's ideas were translated into action. A terrorist executive committee was formed in the Spring of 1879. It consisted of adherents of several revolutionary bodies. The latter were organized in three circles, one cocentrically opening into the other. The innermost circle formed the executive committee. It drew its co-workers out of the lower bodies. Only individuals who were in the position to participate directly in the revolutionary work were taken into this conspiratorial scheme.

The activity of this executive committee led in the following winter to the formation of the People's Will Party (*Narodnaya Volya*). Shelyabov, who had worked in the old executive committee, was the head of the new organization. Members were recruited by the individual circles. The executive committee was chosen by a free vote of its membership and the representatives of the lower groups. The latter had in their province the general work of preparing for the uprising, such as propaganda for a Constituent Assembly, drafting demands in behalf of the peasants and raising of funds. Special groups took charge of propaganda in the army and among students and workers, or ran presses, organized the sale of newspapers and the placing of bombs. Each body remained independent in its particular branch of activity. However, the executive committee gave "political leadership" to the total organization. It controlled the execution of the entire revolutionary program, regulated connections among the various groups and issued the party press. In its hands was concentrated the armed struggle against the government. Under its immediate command stood the combatant bands, each consisting of about ten men, and formed independently of other sections of the total organization. In the execution of its task, each terrorist band acted independently. It was formed and recruited by its own vote. However, the executive committee could veto the admission of any candidate. Once a terrorist band was in action, it chose a leader, who then received dictatorial powers of command.

This was the organization of the terrorist Narodniki. Their executive committee and combatant groups were classic organizations of professional revolutionaries, requiring from their members complete devotion to their revolutionary work, renunciation of their civil activity and private life and submission to an iron discipline.

The organization of the terrorist Narodniki was quite suited to their political aim. The People's Will Party consisted of about 500 members; around them gathered several thousand sympathizers. The terrorist bands themselves were limited to several dozen individuals.

During the three years of their activity, the terrorist Narodniki executed six attempts on the lives of very high officials and four attempts on the lives of chiefs of police. They also carried out the death sentence imposed by their Executive Committee on Tsar Alexander II. Besides, nine spies and traitors were put to death.

The Bolsheviks liked to attach themselves historically to the prototype offered by the organization of the Terrorist Narodniki. For they recognized in it all the features they considered essential in their own organization: the total power of the central leadership, the professional-revolutionary composition, absolute centralization, military discipline. If in spite of their meager forces, the Narodnik terrorists could accomplish a great deal by means of this organizational principle—what could be done by an organization that was much larger and hoped to support itself on the mass power of the proletariat! Why, that way Russia could really be "taken off its hinges."

Lenin wanted an organization that would unite in itself: "socialist science and the revolutionary experience that the lessons of many decades have instilled in the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia." (*Collected Works*, Vol. IV, section 1, page 45.)

By uniting the formal principle of "democratic centralism" with the Narodnik principle of a professional-revolutionary

organization, the Bolsheviks created their particular, typically Russian, type of party organism.

(The following sections are entitled: "The Political Line," "The National-Revolutionary Tradition," "Bolshevist Jacobinism." Essays by Sprenger also appear in nos. 7 and 9 of volume 2, *International Review*. These issues may be acquired by writing to P. O. Box 44, Sta. O, New York, N. Y.) This is the first publication of Sprenger's theoretic work on the History of Bolshevism.

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